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This paper examines procyclicality of the financial system. The introduction 
describes the natural and regulatory sources of procyclicality, focusing on the 
potential procyclical effect of the current Basel II regulatory framework for banks. 
It also mentions the regulatory tools for mitigating procyclical behaviour by 
financial institutions currently being discussed in international forums. Under 
certain conditions, procyclical behaviour of the banking sector can lead to an 
adverse feedback loop whereby banks, in response to an economic downswing, 
engage in deleveraging and reduce their lending to the economy in order to 
maintain the required capital adequacy ratio. This then further negatively affects 
economic output and impacts back on banks in the form of, for example, increased 
loan losses. In the main empirical section of the paper, this effect was simulated on 
the example of the Czech banking sector. The simulation results suggest that under 
certain assumptions the feedback loop may play an important role. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the issues that have taken centre stage in the international debate on the lessons of the 
global financial crisis is that of procyclicality of the financial system. Procyclical behaviour of 
the financial system, and especially of banks, means that financial intermediaries amplify 
swings in economic activity. This might be of higher relevance especially for the EU 
countries with traditionally bank-based financial system. Procyclical behaviour can have 
particularly serious implications in an economic downturn, as under certain assumptions it can 
considerably prolong and deepen the recession via a feedback effect on the economy. 
This paper sets out to describe the main arguments of the current debate on financial system 
procyclicality and to give an overview of the current regulatory proposals for reducing 
procyclicality. To illustrate the seriousness of the effects of the potential strongly procyclical 
behaviour of the financial sector on a selected EU economy, the adverse feedback loop was 
simulated for the case of an adverse scenario for the Czech Republic. This is a useful case 
study as the banking system in this particular EU country is a typical example of an integrated 
financial system with the rest of the EU, as majority of banks in the Czech Republic are 
foreign-owned mostly by other EU institutions. Ideally, one would like to provide an 
empirical analysis of this phenomenon for the EU as a whole, but the data limitations are 
preventing us to do so. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the sources of procyclicality of the 
financial system and summarises the debate on three related areas of regulation: provisioning, 
accounting rules for revaluation of financial assets and the procyclical effect of the current 
Basel II bank capital regulatory framework. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the tools 
that can be used to reduce procyclicality of the financial system. Section 4 describes an 
empirical simulation of the adverse feedback loop for the case of the Czech economy. Section 
5 concludes by summarising the main findings from the synoptic and empirical sections. 
2. Procyclicality of the financial system 
Procyclicality is usually defined as the magnification of swings in the economic cycle by 
financial sector activities, most notably bank lending. It is caused by a whole range of 
interconnected factors, such as information asymmetry, fluctuations in balance-sheet quality, 
over-optimistic (or over-pessimistic) expectations, herd behaviour by market participants and 
financial innovation. Besides the natural sources of procyclicality, financial regulation and the 
accounting rules for revaluation of financial assets in financial institutions’ balance sheets can 
play an important role.  
The main determinants of the credit cycle are discussed in the literature connected with the 
cyclical nature of bank lending. Numerous studies have shown a positive correlation between 
GDP and the credit cycle (e.g. Calza, Gartner and Sousa, 2001). The profitability of corporate 
projects and credit demand rise in line with economic activity and productivity. Conversely, 
banks react to rising macroeconomic uncertainty by reducing the supply of credit 
(Quagliariello, 2007). Growth in interest rates has a negative effect on real sector demand   2
owing to increased financing costs and can also adversely affect supply via banks’ reaction to 
the increased credit risk of firms and households or the lower profitability of investment 
projects (Calza, Gartner and Sousa, 2001). However, if growth in interest rates leads to a fall 
in profit margins, banks may increase the supply of loans in an attempt to maintain their 
profitability thanks to larger loan portfolios. The impact of interest rate changes is therefore 
not entirely clear-cut. Koopman, Kraussl, Lucas and Monteiro (2009) demonstrate empirically 
that GDP is the most significant indicator affecting bank lending.
1 Macroeconomic 
fluctuations affect not only the volume of loans in the economy, but also credit standards. 
Maddaloni (2009) demonstrated on data for the euro area countries that credit standards are 
tightened at times of economic contraction and softened at times of economic growth. 
Moreover, low interest rates cause credit standards to be softened (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). Another natural source of procyclicality is the way in which risks are measured and 
managed. Problems distinguishing between short-term swings and longer-term trends and 
estimating robust correlations between market and economic variables, together with the use 
of risk management techniques that take into account relatively short periods of past 
observations, can cause risks to build up in an expansion phase (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 
2001). This phase usually results in growth in optimistic expectations, leading to rising 
leverage of financial and non-financial institutions at times of growth. Simultaneously, the 
need to create a buffer of reserves for the adverse phase of the cycle is underestimated during 
the growth phase. During the subsequent economic slowdown, measured risk rises sharply 
and leverage falls, with mutually reinforcing effects on the financial and non-financial sectors 
in a situation where financial institutions have inadequate capital and other buffers.  
In the field of financial regulation, discussions are going on in three areas. The first is the 
system of provisioning for bad assets, in particular non-performing loans. Efforts are being 
made to find a provisioning mechanism that will ensure timely recognition of loan losses and 
reduce the sensitivity of financial institutions to cyclical fluctuations in the economy. This is 
generating a conflict between macro-prudential regulation and current accounting principles. 
Advocates of the macro-prudential concept are pushing for the introduction of a provisioning 
system that would ideally cover expected losses over the entire economic cycle. This concept, 
implemented, for example, under the name “dynamic provisioning” in Spain in 2000, is aimed 
at enabling banks to build up a capital buffer in good times that can be used in bad times (De 
Lis, Pages and Saurina, 2001).
2 A countercyclical capital framework should foster a more 
stable banking system and dampen the impacts of cyclical fluctuations. By contrast, the 
accounting authorities prefer information provided to investors to be verifiable and object that 
dynamic provisioning allows profit to be manipulated and artificially smoothed on the basis of 
“excessive” provisioning in times of boom. The conflict between the regulatory and 
accounting views of loan loss provisioning is examined in, for example, Borio and Lowe 
(2001) and Frait and Komárková (2009).  
The second area is the debate regarding the accounting rules for revaluing financial assets 
using market prices. The application of “mark-to-market” techniques for valuing financial 
assets (fair value accounting) can foster procyclicality of the financial system, particularly 
given the assumption that market prices are themselves procyclical because of over-optimism 
or imperfections in risk measurement and management (Novoa, Scarlata and Sole, 2009). 
Asset valuation based on current market prices involves assessing risks which arise from the 
current situation and which therefore do not reflect the entire business cycle. During a growth 
                                                 
1 Eickmeier, Hofmann and Worms (2006) show that the fall in lending in Germany in 2000–2005 was driven by 
an adverse supply shock. 
2 Saurina (2009) suggests that the dynamic provisioning system played a positive role in maintaining the stability 
of the Spanish banking sector during the global financial crisis.   3
phase, financial risk indicators (such as default rate and asset price volatility) thus tend to 
decrease. This encourages growth in market liquidity at times of economic growth and the 
acceptance of a higher level of risk and subsequently growth in the leverage of financial 
institutions (including off-balance-sheet exposures). 
The final area being discussed in relation to procyclicality of the financial system is Basel II 
itself (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). Basel II requires banks to hold higher 
capital if the risks associated with holding financial assets (loans and securities) rise. This is 
because the capital requirement for credit risk is a function of the probability of default (PD), 
the loss given default (LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD), whose values and 
correlations can change according to the phase of the economic cycle.
3 
The procyclicality of Basel II – or the sensitivity of risk parameters to the current cyclical 
position of the economy – may be the main source of the feedback effect, as an economic 
contraction will generate, via growth in PD and LGD, a need for higher capital requirements, 
which, given certain assumptions, can lead to a decrease in lending to the real economy 
(“deleveraging”). Such a decrease, however, can produce a further negative effect on the real 
economy and a further increase in PD and LGD with a subsequent further increase in the 
capital requirements (Benford and Nier, 2007). The assumptions for strongly procyclical bank 
behaviour are discussed in detail in section 4, which subsequently contains an empirical 
illustration of the feedback effect on data for the Czech Republic. 
 
3. Proposals for mitigating procyclicality 
At least since the global financial crisis erupted, numerous international initiatives have been 
examining how regulatory, macro-prudential and accounting principles can mitigate 
procyclicality of the financial system. The main platforms for the debate of these principles 
are the Financial Stability Forum (since 2009 called the Financial Stability Board, FSB), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS). These forums make use of technical and professional assistance 
from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. Given the significant role of 
accounting principles, discussions are also going on within the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). At European level, these efforts are being coordinated by the 
European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), certain committees under the 
European Council (the Economic and Financial Committee, EFC) and the Lamfalussy 
committees, in particular the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). The 
European initiatives were launched back in October 2007 under the ECOFIN Roadmap. 
The first set of proposals to mitigate procyclicality contains measures relating to the 
provisioning system. In this context, the European Commission has published a consultation 
paper that should result in an amendment of the capital directive. This document proposes to 
mitigate the procyclicality arising from regulation by means of provisioning and by 
introducing additional measures on top of the asset risk-based regulatory requirements, by 
ensuring responsible borrowing and lending, and by removing national discretions (e.g. in 
respect to capital requirements and capital) (EU Commission, 2009, 2010). Since 2009, the 
                                                 
3 The risk of procyclicality was taken into account when Basel II was being prepared and some countercyclical 
elements, such as a requirement for conservative PD and LGD estimates (ideally covering the entire business 
cycle and containing a conservative buffer) were incorporated into the overall framework. In addition, under 
Basel II the time series used to estimate the models should cover essentially the entire economic cycle, bank 
portfolios should be tested for resilience to extreme shocks, and the models used should be validated and 
backtested.   4
IASB has also been engaged in revising the provisioning system so that provisions cover 
expected losses through the cycle.
4 
In connection with changes in asset accounting, an IASB Exposure Draft (2009) on new 
accounting standards has been approved. Under these rules there are to be only two categories 
of financial instruments – those measured at amortised cost and those measured at fair value. 
A financial asset or financial liability should be measured at amortised cost if the instrument 
has basic loan features and it is managed on a contractual yield basis. In other cases, the 
instrument should be measured at fair value. This would substantially reduce the complexity 
of measurement of financial instruments, as under currently valid IAS 39 there are four 
categories of financial assets and two categories of financial liabilities. The tools under 
discussion also include a BCBS proposal to introduce leverage limits. This leverage ratio 
would be used as a safeguard against excessive growth in banking transactions and 
underestimation of risks undertaken at times of economic growth. This issue is also covered 
by a consultation paper of the European Commission (EU Commission, 2010), which is 
coordinating its work with the BCBS. According to this proposal, the leverage ratio should be 
introduced at the end of 2012.  
Probably most attention is being devoted to possible revisions of Basel II itself. A 
fundamental problem with this regulatory framework is that while one of its main objectives 
is to increase the risk-sensitivity of regulatory capital, this simultaneously means that the 
minimum capital requirements of banks are procyclical. Certain measures to mitigate this 
property were implemented into Basel II before it was introduced. Others were added later on, 
during the global financial crisis. Examples include efforts to capture the risk associated with 
off-balance-sheet structures, the risk of a sudden fall in the value of market portfolios and the 
risk of insufficient balance-sheet liquidity. However, available evidence points out that these 
mechanisms are unable to mitigate the cyclicality of Basel II to a sufficient extent. Proposals 
intended to further reduce the procyclicality of the framework are therefore under discussion. 
These suggestions can be divided into three main categories. The first comprises measures 
intended to mitigate the cyclicality of Basel II itself in an attempt to smooth the capital 
requirements over time without losing the ability to differentiate between risks. This can be 
achieved by, for example, reducing the cyclicality of the parameters inputted into the capital 
adequacy calculation. Another option is to smooth the already calculated capital requirements, 
i.e. to create countercyclical capital reserves on top of the minimum capital requirements. The 
third and final set of measures is linked with the relationship between capital requirements 
and provisioning.
5   
The proposal to seek potential measures to reduce the procyclicality of bank lending first of 
all within the existing Basel II framework seems very sensible. For example, the second pillar 
of Basel II allows supervisory authorities to stipulate higher capital requirements if the 
regulator decides that risks are not sufficiently covered. Mandatory stress testing of bank 
portfolios using extremely negative scenarios also plays a supporting role, as does backtesting 
of PD and LGD models using crisis-period data.  
 
4. The feedback loop and its empirical simulation for the Czech Republic  
In its initial phase the 2007–2009 global financial crisis caused substantial losses on assets 
linked to the sub-prime segment of the US mortgage market in many internationally active 
banks. When falling economic output in most economies started to lead to growth in credit 
                                                 
4 See http://www.iasplus.com/agenda/ias39impairment.htm. 
5 The BCBS opened a public debate on this issue by publishing its Basel II reform proposals in December 2009.   5
risk in the traditional segments of households and corporations, concerns arose about the 
impact of the potential stronger procyclicality of the newly implemented Basel II.
6 This 
uncertainty was exacerbated by the fact that the new regulatory framework was untested by 
crisis and contained certain procyclical elements. 
Figure 1: Feedback loop 
 
 
The main source of concern was the fact that rising credit risk was leading, via growth in PD 
(and possibly also LGD), to growth in risk-weighted assets (or capital requirements) in a 
situation where bank capitalisation had already been significantly weakened by losses from 
toxic assets. Growth in risk aversion and the globally synchronised recession, moreover, 
effectively eliminated any privately funded capital increases. To stop their capital adequacy 
ratios falling below a certain threshold, banks had to radically reduce their exposures to the 
real sector (and tighten their credit standards) and thus reduce their risk-weighted assets. This 
deleveraging process, however, could have adverse consequences for the economy and feed 
back to the banking sector, as a fall in lending to the real sector would inevitably lead to a 
further decline in economic output and thus to further growth in credit risk (the feedback 
effect). This growth could lead to a further decrease in exposure to the real sector, which, in 
turn, would cause a deeper decline in economic output, and so on. Figure 1 illustrates this 
mutually reinforcing feedback loop. 
However, the high degree of procyclicality that would lead to such a feedback loop has 
numerous strong assumptions. First, the volume of risk-weighted assets of most banks would 
have to be a direct function of PD and LGD, i.e. the majority of banks would have to apply 
the IRB approach
7 to the calculation of capital requirements for credit risk. Second, when 
calculating capital requirements most banks would have to use PD and LGD estimates 
responding directly to the phase of the economic cycle (“point-in-time” estimates). Only in 
this case would an economic downturn be reflected immediately in changes in PD and LGD. 
Third, higher capital requirements would have to force the bank to change its behaviour, in 
the sense of reducing the supply of loans. This is possible if the bank is operating at the 
                                                 
6 Basel II was implemented in most European economies in 2007.  


































threshold of its targeted capital adequacy ratio, for example because of a fall in regulatory 
capital due to accumulated accounting losses. However, we would have to assume 
simultaneously that the bank does not have the option of strengthening its regulatory capital 
from external sources or accumulated retained earnings. The capital adequacy ratio targeted 
by banks would moreover have to be higher than the regulatory minimum of 8%. Many banks 
maintain a capital buffer above the regulatory minimum (for example to maintain their 
ratings) which they do not want to fall to zero. Fourth, the reduction in the supply of loans 
would have to exceed the decline in demand for loans due to the contraction in economic 
activity. Otherwise, banks would not have to actively reduce their risk-weighted assets by 
reducing their exposures, but would merely wait for demand for loans to fall spontaneously. 
This simultaneously implies that banks are able in reality to reduce the supply of loans (or 
reduce their portfolios). Fifth and finally, the reduced supply of loans would have to have a 
strong effect on economic output. This implies, for example, that private entities would have 
no other ways of raising funding (for example by issuing securities in the financial markets, 
retaining profits or obtaining funding from non-banking institutions). The propagation 
mechanism and transmission channels of this impact are discussed in more detail in, for 
example, Aikman et al. (2009). 
Using data on the Czech banking sector we tried to simulate the feedback loop for a selected 
adverse macroeconomic scenario. To get as close as possible to a potential real situation, the 
simulation was conducted using disaggregated data on individual banks within the CNB’s 
existing macro-stress-testing system. This system offers a suitable framework thanks to its 
orientation towards adverse macroeconomic scenarios, its dynamic nature (capturing the 
situation in banks over the eight subsequent quarters), the dependence of PD values on 
macroeconomic developments by means of credit models (see Jakubík and Schmieder, 2009) 
and the use of disaggregated data on the portfolios of individual banks in the Czech Republic. 
Although the simulation was conducted under the aforementioned five assumptions, it can 
give us an idea of the magnitude of this effect. In the empirical analysis it is assumed that 
negative macroeconomic developments will foster higher capital requirements for all banks 
owing to higher PD and LGD values in their credit portfolios. These risk parameters are 
inputted into the capital requirement calculation under the Basel II IRB approach. Although 
this advanced method for calculating risk-weighted assets is applied by only a few banks in 
the Czech Republic, the institutions that do apply it are large banks accounting for almost 
three-quarters of total loans to the real sector.  
The simulation was conducted on the data for the Czech banking sector as of 30 September 
2009 using a highly adverse macroeconomic scenario describing a typical crisis in developing 
markets (e.g. the 1997 crisis in the Asian economies). This unlikely yet plausible scenario 
assumes very low Czech economic output in 2010 and a significant rise in risk aversion 
towards the Czech economy, manifesting itself in depreciation of the exchange rate and a rise 
in interest rates (see Chart 1).
8 
                                                 
8 The scenario was created in  November 2009. In order to simulate the feedback effect, however, it is an 
independent macroeconomic scenario.   7
Chart 1: Evolution of key macro-indicators in 
adverse scenario 
(in %; in CZK/EUR) 
 
Chart 2: Evolution of capital adequacy ratio in 
adverse scenario 
(in %; RWA in CZK billions, regulatory capital in 
CZK hundreds of millions) 
We also assumed that banks will generate very low income (especially net interest income 
and net fee and commission income) over the entire simulation period to serve as a first line 
of defence against loan losses and losses due to market risks.
9 This leads immediately to 
absolute losses in many banks due to a fall in the value of bond holdings, exchange rate 
changes and loan loss provisioning, which together exceed the assumed income. The resultant 
losses are reflected immediately in a fall in regulatory capital. 
The downturn in economic output, however, is reflected simultaneously in growth in risk 
weights via growth in PD and LGD and leads to higher risk-weighted assets. In some banks, 
this can give rise to pressure to maintain sufficient capital adequacy.
10 Compared to the initial 
position as of 30 September 2009, the aggregate capital adequacy ratio is lower owing to a fall 
in capital (due to realisation of accounting losses) and to the rise in risk-weighted assets (see 
Chart 2), and is bordering on the regulatory minimum of 8%.  
Assuming that all banks want to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of, say, 10% and there is no 
way of raising capital externally,
11 the logical response of banks is to lower their risk-
weighted assets by reducing their credit exposures. The aforementioned results of the adverse 
scenario already contain a decrease in the credit portfolio reflecting reduced demand in an 
environment of weak economic output. To maintain a sufficient capital buffer, banks would 
therefore have to resort to a further decrease in loans in excess of the decline in credit 
demand. 
In the following analysis of the feedback effect we proceed in a sequential manner. This 
approach is permitted by the dynamic nature of the banking sector stress-testing system. In the 
first quarter of the simulation (in this case 2009 Q4) banks are exposed to the effect of the 
worse economic situation and observe growth in PD and estimated LGD, a fall in the value of 
                                                 
9 The scenario assumes that banks’ net income (i.e. income gross of the effect of macroeconomic shocks) in the 
period 2009 Q4–2011 Q3 will reach just 50% of the average for the previous two years. This is an extreme 
assumption used to create a truly bad but still possible alternative scenario that is consistent with the 
aforementioned assumptions for realisation of the feedback effect.  
10 PD is estimated using credit risk models, while growth in LGD is simulated by expert estimation; in the 
corporate exposure segment, for example, a rise in LGD from the regulatory 45% to 70% is assumed. 
11 The option of increasing capital internally from retained earnings is kept, but this is more of a theoretical 
option given the assumed accumulated losses.   8
bonds, very low yields and also a decline in demand for loans. On the basis of these observed 
developments, banks for the first time calculate for themselves what their capital adequacy 
ratio would be at the end of the quarter if they failed to react in a significant way. If this 
calculated capital adequacy ratio is lower than required (the 10% assumed above), they will 
reduce their exposures during this quarter such that the resulting capital adequacy ratio is at 
least 10%. This is, of course, a very simplifying assumption, as the reduction in exposures 
would in reality probably last more than one quarter. 
In the adverse scenario given here, 15 of the 21 banks tested are forced to react in the first 
quarter of the simulation.
12 The reduction in the supply of loans (for example through the sale 
of claims out of the banking sector or through the non-renewal of short-term revolving and 
overdraft financing, or even – which is more costly for banks, although not an entirely 
impossible strategy – through the cancellation of standby credit or the reduction of credit 
limits) in excess of the decline in credit demand will have a major impact on the economy, 
especially if economic agents have significantly limited access to funding from alternative 
sources. The existing evidence on bank financing in the Czech Republic suggests that the 
overwhelming majority of non-financial corporations have just one financing bank. This 
effectively prevents firms from switching to other banks with which they have no credit 
history (Geršl and Jakubík, 2009). Market financing is also not very widespread. On the other 
hand, we should add that large firms (which very often have foreign owners) can theoretically 
have other sources of funding either directly from their parent companies or from foreign 
banks in the form of cross-border loans. For the sake of simplicity, the simulation assumes 
very strong financial constraints on firms, which are forced to cut output if they lose bank 
financing, which in turn leads to a further decline in economic output.   
We assume that the reduced bank financing has a slightly lagged effect on the economy such 
that the decline in the loan supply in the first quarter of the simulation is reflected in real GDP 
in the following quarter, i.e. in 2010 Q1. The key issue is the estimation of the feedback effect 
itself. In this paper we use a simple approach based on an estimate of the elasticity of GDP to 
changes in lending. Most of the studies applying this idea are based on the methodology 
presented in Driscoll (2004). This technique was also used by Čihák and Brooks (2009), who 
in cooperation with the European Central Bank for a panel of European countries estimated 
the elasticity between a decline in the year-on-year growth rate of loans (in excess of the 
decline caused by reduced loan demand) and year-on-year real GDP growth at around 0.1. 
This means that, for instance, a decline in the year-on-year growth rate of loans of 10 
percentage points in excess of the decline due to lower demand is reflected in a decline in 
year-on-year GDP growth in the following quarter of 1 percentage point. This elasticity 
estimate was used to simulate the feedback effect for the Czech economy. 
The contraction of the economy in the second quarter of the simulation (2010 Q1) caused by 
the feedback effect is reflected in bank portfolios in further growth of PD in the following 
quarters (LGD is assumed to be at a higher, but constant level). This leads to increased growth 
in loan losses, a decrease in regulatory capital and a rise in risk-weighted assets. At the same 
time, however, the feedback effect also generates a further decline in demand for credit in the 
given quarter.
13 The overall effects on profit/loss, regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets 
in 2010 Q1 and hence the resultant capital adequacy ratio depends on the calibration of the 
scenario and the size of the portfolios relative to banks’ income. In 2010 Q1, banks will 
evaluate the expected impact of the economic environment on the resultant capital adequacy 
                                                 
12 As capital regulation is responsible for the procyclical behaviour of banks in this simulation, the simulation is 
performed only for capitalised banks, i.e. branches of foreign banks are excluded. 
13 Another highly likely impact would be a decline in net income; this is fixed in the simulation for the time 
being and does not change as GDP declines further.    9
ratio and, if necessary, will further decrease the credit supply during the quarter. This will 
negatively affect GDP in the next quarter. The simulation performed here reveals, for 
example, that the same number of banks as in 2009 Q4 must further reduce their loan 
portfolios.
14 The same logic is then applied to all eight quarters for which the simulation is 
performed. Hence, if the feedback effect materialises, the original scenario (see Chart 1) and 
the original path of the effect on the banking sector (see Chart 2) do not apply and the 
economy and the key banking sector variables develop differently (see Chart 3 and Chart 4). 
For the sake of simplicity, the simulation of the effect of procyclical bank behaviour on the 
economy is performed only for GDP; the other macroeconomic variables maintain their 
original paths. This is, of course, a very significant simplification. It can be expected, for 
example, that monetary policy-makers would in all probability react to the sharper decline in 
GDP by easing the interest-rate conditions.  
Chart 3: Evolution of total loans in adverse 
scenario 
(year-on-year growth in %) 
 
 
Chart 4: Evolution of real GDP in adverse scenario 
(year-on-year growth in %) 
 
Chart 3 shows the evolution of year-on-year loan portfolio growth for the scenario without the 
feedback effect (i.e. with a demand-driven decline in loans only) and for the scenario with the 
feedback effect. The difference in the paths is directly correlated with the impact on GDP 
growth, as illustrated in Chart 4.  
The decline in credit exposure reduces risk-weighted assets such that all the banks maintain 
the targeted capital adequacy ratio of 10% (see Chart 5). The path of the capital adequacy 
ratio in the presence of the feedback effect is thus better, since RWA declines. However, the 
worse evolution of the economy is reflected, with a lag, in growth of the risk parameter PD 
for the principal sectors of the economy (see Chart 6). 
                                                 
14 Only in the third quarter of the simulation, i.e. in 2010 Q2, does the number of reacting banks start to fall 
slightly.   10
Chart 5: Evolution of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
and RWA in adverse scenario 
(in %; in CZK billions) 
Chart 6: Evolution of PD predictions for 
corporations and households in adverse scenario 
(in %) 
The simulation results depend on many of the parameters discussed above. Besides the 
elasticity between the supply of loans and GDP growth, the key parameters include above all 
the capital adequacy ratio targeted by banks. For this reason, we conducted several alternative 
simulations with different targeted capital adequacy ratios of 8% and 9% and the original 
10%. As the simulation results show (see Chart 7), the impact on the GDP growth path ranges 
from one percentage point (for a targeted capital adequacy ratio of 8%) to two percentage 
points (for a targeted capital adequacy ratio of 10%) of year-on-year GDP growth over a 
period of at least one year.  
Chart 7: Evolution of real GDP in adverse scenario 
given alternative assumptions about targeted 
capital adequacy ratio 
(year-on-year growth in %) 
5. Conclusion 
This paper set out to present an overview of the debate on the sources and effects of 
procyclical behaviour of the bank-based financial system that prevails in most EU countries. 
The main natural and regulatory sources of procyclicality were discussed, as were the current 
regulatory proposals for mitigating procyclicality.    11
In the event of a very strong decline in economic activity, and given some assumptions, 
procyclical behaviour by financial intermediaries can lead to a feedback loop, i.e. a mutually 
reinforcing effect between growing risks in the financial/banking sector and in the real 
economy. The main objective of the paper was to try to simulate the potential magnitude of 
this feedback loop on the example of a selected EU country, namely the Czech Republic. A 
single highly adverse scenario was chosen for the simulation and the entire simulation was 
performed on disaggregated data for the Czech banking sector using the CNB’s stress-testing 
system. 
The results of the simulation showed that under certain assumptions the feedback effect on the 
real economy can be 1–2 percentage points of year-on-year GDP growth over a period of at 
least one year. Procyclicality of the financial system should thus be taken into account in 
economic and macro-prudential policy-making.  
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